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redis-operator restarts on rke-prod caused by leader-election lease timeout

The redis-operator pod in namespace redis-operator on the rke-prod cluster has been restarting intermittently (223 restarts over 18 days as of ~2026-08-19, down to ~17 restarts over 11 days / ~1.5 per day as of 2026-09-13, stable for the last 3 days). Root cause (confirmed via --previous pod logs): a leader-election lease-renewal timeout against the Kubernetes API server (context deadline exceeded on the coordination.k8s.io Lease API call), causing the controller-runtime manager to self-exit(1) with "leader election lost". Not an OOMKill (exit code 1, not 137; memory well within its 500Mi Guaranteed limit) and not a liveness/readiness probe kill (the health-probe server was up; the shutdown was self-triggered and orderly). Correlates with node-level API-connectivity flakiness on worker node lprkeprod08: recurring client-go "watch ended: short buffer" errors in the operator's own log, several unrelated pods on that same node showing similarly elevated restart counts (rke2-canal CNI, authentik-rke-prod-server, yamtrack-rke-prod, node-exporter), and a rke2-cert-monitor CertificateExpirationWarning event firing repeatedly (84 times over 4d2h) about RKE2 system certs on that node. Circumstantial, not proven as the direct trigger, but consistent with the kind of issue that produces intermittent apiserver TLS/API-call timeouts. Recommended follow-up: run a cert check against node lprkeprod08 specifically (a worker-node cert check, distinct from the already-tracked lprkegest04 control-plane cert expiry on 2026-09-19). Not urgent - the restart rate has already dropped ~8x and the pod has been stable for 3 days - but the underlying trigger is unaddressed and should be expected to recur. Separate from the ThinkRedis application-instance hardening work (auth/NetworkPolicy/TLS) - this is about the operator itself, not a consumer.

Infrastructure
claude·27 days ago
Planned

Management cluster cannot survive losing one server

Found during a full audit of the migration plan against the live estate, 2026-09-07. The platform runs two clusters. The one that serves you is correctly spread so that any single server can fail without interrupting anything � that was verified and is working as designed. The second cluster, which runs the platform's own tooling rather than the services you use, is not spread that way right now. Two of its three coordinating members ended up on the same physical server during the migration. If that one server goes down, that cluster stops until it comes back. What this does and does not affect. No service you use depends on this. The risk is to administration and automation � deployments, backups tooling and configuration management would pause until the server returned. Why it happened, and why it was reasonable. The third server still has a disabled controller cache from a hardware fault. A previous outage was traced to exactly that combination � an unbuffered write path under a coordinating member � so one was deliberately kept off it. That was the right call at the time; the cost is the concentration this ticket describes. Two honest ways out, no third: repair the controller cache and move the member back, or record a deliberate decision to accept that this cluster tolerates no loss of that one server. Leaving it unstated is the only bad option, because the written plan still says the members are spread one-per-server when they are not. Tracked in the migration plan as P4.15c.

Infrastructure
claude 3·about 1 month ago